The Science Behind Moral Intuition: Q&A with Graham Wood on His Groundbreaking Framework
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Written by Graham Wood, author of Moralistics and Psychomoralistics
A Brief Intro to the Book
This book brings together three distinct research programmes in moral psychology – Moral Foundations Theory, Cognitive Adaptations for Social Exchange, and the Linguistic Analogy in Moral Psychology – and shows that they can be combined to create a unified cognitive science of moral intuition.
The book assumes evolution has furnished the human mind with two types of judgement: intuitive and deliberative. Focusing on moral intuitions (understood as moral judgments that were not arrived at via a process of conscious deliberation), the book explores the origins of these intuitions, examines how they are produced, and explains why the moral intuitions of different humans differ.
Providing a unique synthesis of three separate established fields, this book presents a new research programme that will further our understanding of the various different intuitive moral judgements at the heart of some of the moral tensions within human society.
What inspired you to write Moralistics and Psychomoralistics?
For many years now I have been wrestling with the question: what are moral values and where do they come from? Are they ‘written into the cosmos’ in some way? Are they something that an individual can simply deem to be the case for themselves? Do they come into being by some (perhaps complex) set of social facts? Or perhaps there is an evolutionary explanation? I don’t know, but these questions remind me of the saying ‘a journey of a thousand miles starts with one step’. These questions are a journey of a thousand miles.
My first step is this book. In it I seek to understand intuitive moral judgements, as distinct from deliberative moral judgements. Some moral philosophers may say that intuitive moral judgement is the wrong place to start, but on any journey, one has to start somewhere! Deliberative moral judgement is that which takes conscious effort (sometimes large amounts of effort). It is obvious to oneself (and perhaps to others) when one is engaged in deliberative moral judgement. One consciously deliberates, considering different factors relevant to the judgement.
One may take days, weeks or years to deliberate, and one may or may not reach a judgement. On the other hand, intuitive moral judgement does not take (conscious) effort. Intuitive moral judgements are fast and seem to take no effort at all. It is these judgments that is the focus of the book.
Can you share the significance behind the title and what readers should anticipate from the terms “Moralistics” and “Psychomoralistics”?
The terms ‘Moralistics’ and ‘Psychomoralistics’ are directly parallel to the terms ‘Linguistics’ and ‘Psycholinguistics’. One of the existing research programmes this book unifies (with two others) is the Linguistic Analogy in Moral Psychology. As the name suggests a number of researchers in moral psychology asssume that progress understanding moral psychology will be made by comparing moral psychology with the human capacity for natural language. The vast majority of humans develop a capacity to speak one or more natural languages, starting with the language spoken around them in their formative years. Perhaps analogously, the vast majority of humans develop a capacity to represent moral values to themselves and others, again starting with the set of moral values represented around them in their formative years.
If this is a good analogy, perhaps just as there are natural human languages there are also something like intuitive human moral languages. This would explain the facts that firstly there is variability across sets of human moral intuitions, but secondly that there is also commonality across sets of human moral intuitions. For example, what specifically constitutes ‘justice’ varies across human cultures, but the concept of ‘justice’ is common across human cultures. Linguistics and Psycholinguistics are the academic fields that seek to understand natural human languages, and I hope ‘Moralistics’ and ‘Psychomoralistics’ soon become the academic fields that seek to understand human moral intuitions.
Your book integrates Moral Foundations Theory, Cognitive Adaptations for Social Exchange, and the Linguistic Analogy in Moral Psychology. How do these frameworks collectively contribute to a unified cognitive science of moral intuition?
The Linguistic Analogy in Moral Psychology assumes that lessons can be learnt about intuitive moral judgement from the human capacity for natural language (see pp. 31-34 of the book). One approach to understanding the human capacity for natural language assumes the existence of a ‘universal grammar’ that is innate in humans. On one account, this universal grammar involves both ‘principles’ and ‘parameters’. The principles are universal, but the parameter settings associated with those principles are not set before birth, rather they are set when human infants begin to experience the natural language being spoken around them after birth. The principles together with the parameter settings constitute competence in the local natural language. The Linguistic Analogy in Moral Psychology research programme assumes analogously that there is a ‘universal moral grammar’ that also involves both principles and parameters. Again, the moral principles are universal, but the parameter settings associated with those principles a not set before birth, they are set when human infants begin to experience the ‘moral language’ being represented around them after birth. The principles together with the parameter settings constitute competence in the local moral language.
Moral Foundations Theory assumes that intuitive moral judgements are generated by a number of ‘moral foundations’ (see pp. 34-35 of the book). These moral foundations include: harm/care, fairness/cheating, loyalty/betrayal; authority/subversion; and sanctity/degradation. These moral foundations are common across humanity, but advocates of Moral Foundations Theory assume that different foundations can be more or less active between different sub-populations of humans. For example, it has been claimed (within the US political context) that the intuitive moral values of supporters of the Democratic Party can be explained with reference to two foundations, namely harm/care and fairness/cheating (the other moral foundations being less active), while the intuitive moral values of supporters of the Republican Party can be explained with reference to all moral foundations (when all foundations are approximately equally active). This can be understood with reference to the principles and parameters assumed to exist in a universal moral grammar. All humans share all moral foundations (i.e., relating to the principles) but the local environment of newborn humans affect which moral foundations become active and to what extent they become active (i.e., relating to the parameter settings).
Cognitive Adaptations for Social Exchange is a research programme concerned with identifying and studying the actual computational algorithms that generate intuitive moral judgements (see pp. 36-39 of the book). Consider the possibility that two people are negotiating a social exchange of some sort. Researchers in this programme characterise social exchange as involving two features ‘rationed benefits’ and ‘requirements’. In such exchanges a rationed benefit is defined, and if a specified requirement is met, then the rationed benefit is exchanged for the requirement. This is intuitively judged as a fair social exchange. But if one party delivers the requirement and yet the rationed benefit is not given, then this is intuitively judged as cheating on the social exchange. Similarly, if somehow one party fails to deliver the specified requirement and yet the rationed benefit is given, then this is intuitively judged as cheating on the social exchange as well.
So, using insights from the Linguistic Analogy in Moral Psychology, one can consider moral intuitive judgements in terms of the principles and parameters of a universal moral grammar. Using insights from Moral Foundations Theory, one can think of principles and parameters relating to harm/care, fairness/cheating, loyalty/betrayal; authority/subversion; and sanctity/degradation. Finally, using insights from Cognitive Adaptation for Social Exchange one can understand the actual computation algorithms functioning within the fairness/cheating dimension of any local instantiation of the universal moral grammar, and these insights also illustrate how research could proceed across other dimensions.
Thus, these three research programmes collectively contribute to a unified cognitive science of moral intuition, a new research programme I call Moralistics and Psychomoralistics.
Can you share a real-world example or case study featured in the book that illustrates key concepts?
Assuming that the human capacity for intuitive moral judgement is an evolved capacity that has not undergone any substantive evolutionary change in the last 10,000 years, then all humans since then have been using the same capacity to intuitively represent moral values to themselves and others. Further assuming that intuitive moral values directly impact on explicit moral and legal codes in some way, then an understanding of how intuitive moral values come into being will go long way to help understand the nature of explicit moral and legal codes in all their variability from the codes of ancient Mesopotamia up to the present day. One powerful real-world example is slavery. There are many examples of cultures that historically explicitly permitted slavery (e.g., as recorded in law) and that may have been caused by the intuitive judgement that slavery was permissible.
If one wishes to understand this, one can use the conceptual framework provided by Moralistics and Psychomoralistics. For example, the parameter settings related to the principles governing harm/care may be set such that slaves are in a different intuitive moral category compared to non-slaves. This would explain why in, for example, the Code of Hammurabi, a particular harm that is permissible (or perhaps even legally obligatory) in relation to a slave is not permissible in relation to a non-slave.
Reflecting on your journey writing this book, what was the most surprising or enlightening discovery you made about moral intuition?
I made a discovery that was both surprising and enlightening with respect to pornography. Pornography has been either permissible or impermissible in different human cultures at various times throughout history. There have been a number of arguments on both sides of this issue that have been the product of conscious deliberation. However, these arguments arrived at via conscious deliberation are not my focus. My focus is on intuitive moral judgements about pornography. The conceptual framework of Moralistics and Psychomoralistics provides an intriguing insight into possible intuitive moral judgments about pornography.
Assume for argument’s sake that some individuals have an intuitive moral judgement that pornography is impermissible, while other individuals don’t. What might explain this difference in intuitive judgements? Consider the possibility that in some intuitive moral languages sex is a rationed benefit (as understood in the Cognitive Adaptations for Social Exchange research programme) and in other cultures sex is not a rationed benefit. In cultures where sex is a rationed benefit, then some individuals can offer sex in a social exchange for some requirement (say the provision of a resource) being offered by some other individual.
In cultures where sex is a rationed benefit and pornography is available then its availability may undermine the status of sex as a rationed benefit and hence undermine some individual’s ability to exchange sex for resources. Thus, perhaps in societies where sex is considered a rationed benefit, the production and consumption of pornography is intuitively judged by members of that society as cheating on a social exchange. Furthermore, parameter settings concerning harm/care and sanctity/degradation may also be involved in intuitive moral judgements about pornography.
If readers could take away one key message or insight from the book, what would it be?
Over millennia philosophers across a range of human cultures have provided consciously deliberated moral judgements about human behavior and all this takes considerable effort. I suggest that most people most of the time do not use effortful conscious deliberation to make most of their moral judgements. Most people rely on their own intuitive judgements to make choices in life about what is morally permissible and impermissible. It would be good to have insight into how such intuitive moral judgments are actually made by most people most of the time, and research in Moralistics and Psychomoralistics promises such insight.
Moralistics and Psychomoralistics: A Unified Cognitive Science of Moral Intuition
Providing a unique synthesis of three separate established fields, this book presents a new research program that will further our understanding of the various different intuitive moral judgements at the heart of some of the moral tensions within human society.